Considering impatient users in space information networks, a preliminary queue congestion control model was presented. It balanced the network loads and make up for the resource lost from the impatient leaving users. To describe the competition among nodes, the model used queuing game theory. The introduced congestion control platform, which consisted of service nodes, calculated user's gain to determine a threshold of the queue length. When the current queue length reaches the threshold value, some profits from the congestion control platform were lost. Therefore, a preliminary queue was designed to optimize the payoff which eliminated the negative effect from the impatient leaving users. The optimal length of this preliminary queue was configured as the expected number of leaving impatient users. This model improves the efficiency of resources allocation. The simulation results show that it can promote the network performance.
Introduction
Space information networks consist of satellites in various orbits, space stations, spacecraft and their communication. Because of the complicated network environment and the high cost of the communication equipment, it is important to schedule network resources appropriately. Congestion collapse is one of the serious problems which causes a sharp drop of network performance [1] . Users in space information networks ask for services with different requisition. Although users have joined in a queue of service nodes, they may leave the queue due to the long waiting time or the low service efficiency. They are called as impatient users [2] [3] [4] . After entering the queue, impatient users may leave with a certain probability. When the queue is full, new arrival users have to leave. If the leaving behavior occurs before any users being served completely in a full queue, the queue is no longer full and the left new arrival users become the sources of loss. It causes a waste of limited network resources.
To equilibrate the loads, users need to choose the relatively idle nodes. However, these nodes always far from the destination node. Therefore, building a suitable congestion control model is the key mission for maximizing the network carrying capacity. In this paper, we propose a novel Congestion Control based on Queuing Game with Impatient users (CCQGI) scheme. The main point of the queuing game theory is to obtain an equilibrium in the queue as described in [5] by Naor. Its subject is controlling a First-come First-served (FCFS) M/M/1 system. In contrast to the situation in the space information networks, [5] assumed that the presence in a queue will not renege before they are served. We design a preliminary queue to recuperate the resource losing issue from the impatient users leaving the queue. In our model, it suppose that the user needs to pay an admission fee before joining a queue. Congestion Control Platform (CCP) is in charge of resource allocation and congestion avoidance. Profit of CCP is brought mainly by the admission fee. CCQGI scheme is used by CCP to get the threshold of queue length. Then CCP announces the user's gain of each node in CCP to the user. According to the restraint condition of non-negative user's gain, the optimal threshold queue length can be proved. For the situation of impatient users leaving the queue when the queue length reaches threshold, we design a preliminary queue in CCQGI scheme to make up for the loss. It admits the new arrival user after the queue being filled. Once a user joins a queue, the profit of CCP will be obtained. User selects a node with the maximum user's gain that makes the balance of the network loading.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some related work. In Section 3, the theoretical framework is described through the novel congestion control system and the system model. Scheme formulation and the corresponding solution are given in Section 4. The numerical simulations and analysis are made in Section 5. At last, a conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
Related Work
This paper researches on some new points following our lasted work [6] . In the lasted work, service scheduling in Cloud Computing was analyzed using queuing game theory. It maximized the Cloud Computing platform's total payoff through controlling the service scheduling strategy. But the model only considered that when a user's service request came, it would decide whether to join or balk the queue according to the game theory. Congestion control in satellite networks is always an important problem due to the long propagation distance and the high error rate in satellite networks. There are fruitful outcomes for solving the congestion problem as shown in [7] [8] [9] . In [7] , Petraki et al. proposed a resource allocation scheme in satellite networks. For emergency service, a bargaining model was formulated by game theory. Because of only once bargain, the procedure took a short time to satisfy the subject. In [8] , a multilayer multicast congestion control scheme was presented to solve negative impact variable caused by long delays and link errors in satellite networks. The authors designed three phases to control the traffic action and achieve fairness under the balance situation. To overcome the disadvantages of the existing scheme, they adjusted the multicast traffic rate by blocking or releasing multicast layers and used queue state of a bottleneck to count. In [9] , the proposed a reliable multicast transport protocol TCP-Peachtree for satellite networks. A modified B+ tree was chosen to construct multicast groups and subgroups for recovering local error and aggregating acknowledgement. Then they designed jump start and fast recovery algorithms for congestion control in their scheme. Compared with the TCP-New Reno, the results of simulations showed fairness and highly scalability in TCP-Peachtree scheme.
Besides, the difference of user requests may also influence the congestion statement. Related to our work, many researchers use queue theory or game theory to study the congestion problems. Various queuing or game models were proposed according to respond specific backgrounds. We introduce some of them in [10] [11] [12] [13] . In [10] , Fiaschetti et al. focused on the scheme of queue length for enhancing the effectiveness of bandwidth allocation in satellite networks. Using congestion pricing theory, a simple and effective Bandwidth-on-Demand algorithm was proposed with significant network information. In [11] , Kao-Shing et al. proposed cooperative multi-agent congestion controllers to solve this problem. It consisted of a long-term evaluator and predictor and short-term selector which were designed by game theory. Simulation results showed the promoted system utilization and the less packet losses. In [12] , Alpcan et al. defined user's cost function and the utility function as the queuing delay and bandwidth demand respectively. Through the modeled non-cooperative game, they found a unique Nash equilibrium solution including the boundary effects. A bottleneck condition was taken into account also for non-negligible information delays to avoid congestion. In [13] , Ramaswamy et al. proposed tolling scheme for traffic to select one virtual network according to a special request. It can achieve socially optimal and individual optimal by interpreting Lagrange multipliers. Considering different mixes of flow types, they got a Nash equilibrium solution based on game theory.
All above researches explored solution schemes of congestion control, although adopting different methods under various environments. Comparing with their solutions, our work focuses on making up for the influence of impatient users in space information networks. Congestion problem is then relieved during the procedure of searching the optimal strategy.
System Model
In the space information networks, we build a novel congestion control system model to describe the complete physical process with impatient users. Unlike the passive mechanism, users in our system can actively select whether to join a queue according to the situation of their gain. What's more, for multiple nodes model, the users compare their gains of all the nodes and then choose the maximum one to join the queue. Based on the consideration of the impatient users, we design a preliminary queue to make up for the loss. Profits of CCP under two conditions are formulated to present the system performance. At last, we obtain an optimal solution to maximize the CCP's profit.
The Novel Congestion Control System
Our congestion control system, it adopts a CCQGI scheme. Queuing theory and Game theory are the theoretical foundation of CCQGI scheme. Because the arrival rate of the user is irrelevant to its past changes, the action that user enters the buffer and wait in queue for servicing is a Markov process. In order to achieve the optimal network performance, we model the queuing process based on the architecture of the congestion control system as follows. ). Obviously, the user will enter the queue only when its gain satisfies the following condition G(l ij ) ≥ 0. When it enters the queue, it may meet the following conditions. The l ij is too large or service efficiency is too low. Then some impatient users may leave the queue with strength ∆ l which is related to the queue length, and if l → ∞, ∆ l → ∞. Upon the above descriptions, we give the following definitions. From this definition, we can consider the effect from impatient users. Then formulate the queuing model to evaluate the length of a preliminary queue. A stationary Poisson stream of the user arrives to a CCP with parameter λ. The service times of the nodes in the space information network are independent, identically, and exponentially distributed with parameter µ. The system's utilization factor is defined as ρ = λ µ [5] . For stability, we assume that 0 < λ < µ.
Definition 2 A CCP allocates the service nodes' resources according to user requirements. In order to maximize its profit, each node announces an admission fee ϕ(l) to users who want to join in the buffer. Once the user enters the queue and is serviced, the CCP obtains its profit Z(l). The user's gain G(l) is obtained as user's benefit R subtracting ϕ(l) and the cost function Q(l). The user can decide whether to join or to balk the queue according to its gain value.
From this definition, we can formulate the game model to calculate the queue threshold for optimal network performance. CCPs in the space information network are utilized to reduce the degree of congestion for nodes. CCQGI scheme is a key component in a CCP. It computes users' gain G(l). The user will join if it is positive, and balk on the contrary. The CCP controls each queue length through this constraint and gets its maximum profit. Then the network resources are allocated reasonably.
System Model
When a user arrives, there are two conditions. Firstly, if the queue length is no more than the threshold, considering some impatient users leave the queue, the profit of the CCP should subtract this part. Furthermore, if the queue length is more than the threshold, a preliminary queue scheme is proposed to cover the loss from the leaving user. We formulate a queuing game model with impatient users. Specifications of CCQGI scheme parameters are given in Table 1 . In the first condition, the CCP's profit is
where β is a constant optimization factor, and 0 < β < 0.218. q l is the probability of observing l users in the queue. In [5] , Naor uses a constant admission fee to solve a queuing equilibrium issue. Since the CCP should announce an admission fee to encourage or restrain the queue length, ϕ(l) is defined as a monotonically increasing function in our model.
In the second condition, the CCP's profit is
where l th is the threshold length of the queue such that users' gain is non-negative. l α is the actual queue length, and l α > l th . In general, no more users should join the queue when the queue length reaches l th . However, considering the impatient user may leave the queue, we design a preliminary queue to make up for the loss. The length of the preliminary queue l ζ should be satisfy l th < l α < l th + l ζ and the user's gain is assumed to equal zero in order that the user can join in the preliminary queue. q l∈(l th ,lα] denotes the probability of observing l ∈ (l th , l α ] users in the queue. 
Preliminary Queue Congestion Control Scheme
In this section, we focus on full queue condition with impatient user. When a user arrives at a CCP, CCQGI scheme calculates the user's gain as described in Subsection 4.1. Then the user decides whether to join or to balk according to the value of his gain. In order to maximize the profit of the CCP, the user's gain should be non-negative, and then the threshold length of the queue is obtained. If the arriving user spills over the threshold length, it will be allocated to a preliminary queue. This scheme can make up for the loss from the impatient user. First, we formulate CCQGI scheme for single node, and then the result will be promoted to multiple nodes in a CCP.
The Threshold of Queue Length for Single Node
For the single node in a CCP, a user joins the queue and waits for service. The user's benefit from completing service by the CCP is R. Either while waiting or while being served, the cost for a user of staying in the system is C per unit of time. In consideration of the above discussion, we can determine that it is a M/M/1 queuing equilibrium model with impatient user [14, 15] .
Theorem 1 On a single node congestion control platform, the impatient users leave the queue with the strength ∆. The optimal threshold length of the queue is
Proof For the given correct model, the function of users' gain can be calculated as
where Cl µ+∆ l is the cost function Q(l) of the user for staying in the queue with the influence of impatient users. C > 0 and ∆ l = ηl. A user joins the queue only when his gain is non-negative. Assuming that if l satisfies the constrains G(l) ≥ 0 and G(l + 1) < 0, l = l th . Then we can calculate the value of l th as the following inequality equations
The admission fee ϕ(l) is a monotonically increasing function and l ∈ N + .
Because of the effect of impatient users, we should justify the monotonicity of the cost function Q(l). If Q(l+1) > Q(l), Q(l) is a monotonically increasing function.
where µ > 0, 0 < η < 1, C > 0 and l ∈ N + . So Eq. (6) is non-negative, and Q(l) is a monotonically increasing function. Based on the above analysis, we can justify that G(l) is a monotonically decreasing function. Then l th is restricted as a unique value by Eq. (5) and can be written as 
The Preliminary Queue Scheme for Single Node
Under the Nash equilibrium conditions, we obtain the steady-state probability of the queue q l . When queue length reaches l th , a preliminary queue is designed to prevent the decrease of the CCP's profit from the leaving of impatient users. The length of the preliminary queue is denoted as l ζ .
Theorem 2 In a single node congestion control platform, the length of the preliminary queue is
Proof The preliminary queue makes up for the loss from the CCP's profit due to the impatient user. Therefore, the length of the preliminary queue can be evaluated by the expected number of leaving impatient user.l p denotes the expected number of leaving impatient user per unit time. For the given model,l p can be calculated as
Therefore, l ζ can be evaluated as
where l th
(1−η)λl p is the expected time for filling the queue considering the impatient user.l p multiply this expression to get the expected number of leaving impatient user, then the length of the preliminary queue length is obtained as Eq. (10).
Under the stable statement, as shown in [16] we can get the following algebraic equations.
Because of the regularity condition ∞ l=0 p l = 1, p 0 can be calculated as
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For l ζ ∈ N + , then we can get the length of the preliminary queue as follows
The Preliminary Queue Scheme for Single Node
In real space information networks, there is always more than one node which can be selected for a user simultaneously. Therefore, the result of CCQGI scheme for single node should be extended to multiple nodes congestion control model. As shown in Fig. 1 , the situations of the nodes in a CCP are heterogeneous when a user arrives. The user's gain of each node is computed and announced to the user by the CCP. Then the user chooses the queue of the node which brings the maximum gain. Once all the queue length reaches the threshold l th , the preliminary queue scheme will start to make up for the loss from impatient users. For a given model, the optimal the CCP's profit function can be calculated as
where l j th ∈ {l th |maxG j (l j th ), j = 1, 2, . . . , n} (14) l j th denotes the threshold queue length of the node j. The user's gain of a node j is the maximum among all the nodes. Therefore, we get the optimal profit of the CCP. The flow chart of CCQGI scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2 .
Simulation and Comparisons
In this section, we concentrate on the performance simulation of the proposed CCQGI scheme for a single node in a CCP. We will give two simulations to demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed model. In the first numerical simulation, through changing the value of system parameters, the performance of our scheme will be shown. In the second real system simulation, we will compare the end-to-end delay and the throughput of the following two schemes: the traditional scheme and CCQGI scheme. In our model, we assume that new arrival user leaves the queue when its length l reaches the threshold l th without the preliminary queue, while they can join the queue in CCQGI scheme under the situation l th < l α < l th + l ζ . The former situation is denoted as a Congestion Control Without Preliminary Queue (CCWPQ) scheme.
In the first numerical simulation, we get the queue length and the corresponding CCP's profit with different parameter values. The experiments and analysis are divided into following five steps. Firstly, under the restriction that each user's gain is non-negative, CCQGI scheme calculates the threshold length of the queue l th to ensure the optimal performance of space information networks. Secondly, we define an admission fee as a monotonically increasing function which is the principal source of the CCP's profit. Then profit of CCP is obtained under the heterogeneous leaving strengths of impatient user ∆ l . Thirdly, the evaluation of the preliminary queue length l η is given according to our design. Fourthly, the profit of CCP under the heterogeneous leaving strengths of impatient user ∆ α is calculated with l th < l α < l th + l ζ . Lastly, we compare the profit of CCP between CCQGI scheme and CCWPQ scheme over the service process. The value of the common simulation parameters is defined as Table 2 . We define ϕ(l) = l to simplify the following calculation. In the first step, the correspondent threshold length of the queue is simulated with different η as shown in Fig. 3 . The dashed curve describes the value of the threshold length before using the floor function. It rises with the increasing of η which means that the more impatient users leave the queue, the greater threshold length that should be set to implement the optimal network welfare. The reason is that if the leaving strength of the impatient user grows the possibility of network loss increases. The original new arrival user will leave after the queue length reaching the threshold; however, a part of these new arrival users can join the queue since the augmented threshold queue length. Using the floor function to this dashed curve, the threshold queue length l th is obtained as a series of discrete star points.
In the second step, we compare the profit of CCP for various queue lengths under the different η as shown in Fig. 4 . The parameter of leaving strength for the impatient user is given by η = [0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1]. Then we can get corresponding l th from the first step as shown in Fig. 3 . The vertical lines denote the threshold queue lengths correspond each η, respectively. The profit of CCP increases with the growing queue length l < l th . However, different shape points fall with the increasing of the η under the same queue length. It means that if the more impatient users leave the lower profit of CCP that can be obtained under the same queue length.
In order to reduce the loss from the impatient user, a preliminary queue is designed in our model. In the third step, with the preliminary queue, new arrival user can join it and wait for service instead of leaving the queue. CCQGI scheme calculates the preliminary queue length for different η as shown in Fig. 5 . The values of the preliminary queue lengths are described as the dashed curve with changed η. The dashed curve grows up with the increase of η which means that when the higher possibility of impatient users leaving the queue, the greater preliminary queue length should be set to achieve the optimal network welfare. Then after using the floor function to the dashed curve, we can get the real value of the preliminary queue length l ζ as a series of discrete star points in Fig. 5 .
When the queue length satisfies the condition l th < l α < l th + l ζ in the fourth step, we can get the profit of CCP from CCQGI scheme under different η as shown in Fig. 6 . We choose three values of η given by η = [0.4, 0.6, 0.8] for simulation. The vertical lines denote the threshold queue length add one according to each η. Profit of CCP with preliminary queue increases while the queue length grows between the ranges l th to l th + l ζ . Under the same queue length, the profit of CCP drops with the increasing of η which means that the more impatient users leave the worse performance can be received.
In the last step of our experiment, we proof that the designed preliminary queue improves the performance of space information networks. The result is obtained through comparisons of CCP's profit between CCQGI scheme and CCWPQ scheme as shown in Fig. 7 . The parameter of leaving strength for the impatient user is given by η = 0.8. The vertical dotted line denotes the threshold queue length. Circle points denote the profit of CCP using CCWPQ scheme, while star points denote the profit of CCP using CCQGI scheme. Obviously profit of CCP using CCQGI scheme is greater than that using CCWPQ scheme after the queue length exceeding the threshold. It shows that our CCQGI scheme is benefit for improving the network performance. In the second real system simulation, we compare the end-to-end delay and the throughput of the traditional scheme and CCQGI scheme. We build a real simulation environment using OPNET R ○ [17]. All the schemes and data sources are simulated on the Intel Pentium (R) Dualcore 3.00-GHz using C language. To simulate the traditional congestion control scheme, we choose the one proposed in [11] . The end-to-end delay is calculated by the difference between sending time and receiving time. As shown in Fig. 8 , the average end-to-end delay of the CCQGI scheme is lower. The reason is that users will wait for a period when the queue is full in the traditional scheme. While in CCQGI scheme, users can join in the preliminary queue. It saves waiting time From Fig. 9 , we can see that our proposed scheme have the bigger throughput. The explanation is that the designed preliminary queue allows users join in the queue of the service node when the threshold queue length is exceeded. It makes up the throughput payoff lost by the impatient users.
Conclusion
In space information networks, there are impatient users due to various service requests. CCQGI scheme is proposed to make up for the loss from the impatient leaving users. It models the profit of CCP through the equilibrium queuing theory, and calculates the threshold queue length to ensure user's gain being non-negative. Once the queue length reaches the threshold, a preliminary queue is opened to the new arrival user. For single node in CCP, CCQGI scheme implement an optimization of the network performance. Furthermore, CCQGI scheme provides selected standards by computing user's gain for a user under the condition of multiple nodes in CCP. The user chooses the service node which announces the maximum user's gain. The limited resource in space information networks is scheduled better and the network achieves an optimal performance by using CCQGI scheme. Meanwhile, the congestion problems are solved at a certain degree. The results of simulations show the optimal strategy of queue length and prove the feasibility of CCQGI scheme. For the future work, we attempt to apply this result to the routing selection in space information networks. In a real environment user selects a route from the source node to destination node according to the minimum cost and the maximum welfare. Moreover, one can consider other service requests such as different grades of service. It also affects the welfare of the network.
